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1 • I r.t t'Od uct icon 
Much of the empirical evidence involving the accuracy of 
financial analysts' forecasts <hereafter FAF> of upcoming firm 
earnings has addressed FAF accuracy relative to the predictions of 
univariate time-series <hereafter TS> forecasting models. While 
earlier studies have produced mixed results <see Abdel-khalik and 
Thompson <1977-1978>>, recent empirical evidence is bonsistent with 
FAF superiority <see Brown, Griffin, Hagerman, and Zmijewski <1985)). 
Brown et al. (1985) identified two potential sources of FAF 
supet' i ot'i t y: (1) better utilization of information existing at the 
forecast initiation date for the time-series models, a contemporaneous 
advantage, and <2> acquisition and use of information after the 
forecast initiation date for the time-series models, a timing 
advar.tage. Brown et al. provided evidence that FAF superiority is 
attributable to both types of informational advantages, but they did 
not provide any evidence regarding the characteristics of the 
information set underlying FAF. 
Brown, Foster, and Noreen (1984) reported that little has been 
done in modeling determinants of FAF error magnitude. 1 Moreover, no 
work has been done to date either in modeling FAF superiority or in 
relating FAF superiority to attributes of the firm's information 
env i romnent • 
This study models the determinants of FAF superiority in the 
context of the firm's information environment. 
predictions are both adversely affected by the current stochastic 
disturbance term or random shock in earnings. The source of FAF 
superiority can be understood intuitively as the analyst's knowledge 
1 
of the nature of the current disturbance term, something TS models 
car,·l'",ot have. More formally, we present a Bayesian model in which FAF 
superiority is positively related to <1> the dimensionality of the 
analyst's information set, and negatively related to both (2) the 
variance of information observations and (3) the covariance between 
information observations. 
Empirically, surrogates for the theoretical factors are used in 
order to explain FAF superiority for two samples of firms: individual 
analysts <Value Line) and consensus analysts <IBES>. 
is defined as a 2 Rwla2 FAF' the ratio of the variance of a random walk 
<RW> error to the variance of FAF error. The empirical proxies for 
the three informational variables discussed above are: ( 1 ) f i t'm s i z e, 
(2) the prior dispersion of FAF forecasts, and (3) the number of lines 
of business. The test results are generally consistent with an 
information interpretation of FAF superiority. 
The existence of differential firm information environments is 
important to accountants. Atiase (1985) demonstrated that the price 
reaction to earnings is negatively related to firm size, a crude proxy 
for the extent of prior information availability. Our study explores 
finer partitions of the firm's information environment through the use 
of multiple empirical proxies. 
Our finding that FAF superiority is related to firm size is 
consistent with Atiase's firm-size related differential information 
hypc•thesis. Our finding that FAF superiority is also related to the 
prior dispersion of analyst forecasts and the number of lines of 
business suggests that multiple empirical proxies specify the firm's 
information environment more correctly than does a single empirical 
pt~oxy (i.e., size). 
2 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
describes the model formulation and implications. Section 3 describes 
surrogate selection and hypotheses. Section 4 describes the sample 
ar1d data. Methodological considerations are discussed in Section 5. 
Section 6 presents empirical results. A summary and conclusion 
constitute Section 7. 
2. Model Formulation and Implications 
The objective of the model is to examine the relationship between 
FAF superiority and the firm's information environment. The model 
provides theoretical determinants of FAF superiority, conditional on 
the model's assumptions. The model is limited in the sense that it 
does not incorporate such factors as: <1> the supply and demand of 
forecasts and forecast accuracy, <2> macro factors that affect 
forecast accuracy, (3) the interaction between macro and micro factors 
that affect forecast accuracy, and (4) multiperiod intricacies. Thus, 
while the model does provide a basis to examine the effects of the 
information environment, it is not a complete model. 
We make the following assumptions in developing the Bayesian 
model: (1) the information available to the analyst is exogenous; (2) 
the analyst uses all available information to generate a forecast; (3) 
the fit•m has existed for T-1 pr·ior· per·iods; <4> the ar.alyst is 
interested in forecasting firm earnings for period T, denoted by RT; 
(5) earnings behave as a random walk process: 
the stochastic error terms aT are a sequence of identically 
distributed, uncorrelated random variables with common mean 0 and 
.,. 
variance a~0 ; (6) prior to observing the n interim information signals 
cv 1 , ••• ,Yn> = Y, the analyst's prior predictive distribution for RT is 
3 
·::· 
r:r'-0; (7) 
after observing Y, the analyst's point estimate of RT is the posterior 
.. · .. 
Y1 , •.• ,Yn, have a multivariate normal distribution and a common mean 
rT, which is the draw of RT determined by nature, but not yet known to 
the analyst; and (9) then interim information signals have a common 
var~iance, 2 u Y' and a common correlation, p, between ~ach pair of 
signals. 2 
Given these assumptions, it can be shown that: 
(1) .-. ·=· U .::. RW ::: •'T'- - = 
- (_) 1/t"o 
2 where u RW denotes the variance of the random walk model forecast 
error, and t"o is defined as 1/a2 0 ; 
(2) 
.-. 
where a.::.FRF denotes the variance of financial analysts' forecast error, 
is a function of the three information variables (n, 2 r:r Y' p) in 
assumption <9> 3 ; and 
.-. 
c. 
a RW 
(3) FRFSUP = ----- = -------
2 
a FRF 
Equation (3) expresses FRF superiority <FRFSUP) as the ratio of 
RW error variance to FRF error variance. FRFSUP increases towards m 
(decreases towards 1) as the analyst's improvement in forecast 
precision over the random walk model increases (decreases), where 
precision is the reciprocal of variance. 
FRFSUP is positively related to the dimensionality of the FRF 
information set (n), and negatively related to both the variance of 
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the interim information observations <a2 y> and the covariance between 
information observations (p). 
If the analyst does not observe information (i.e., n = 0 in 
equation <2>>, then r 1 = 0 and the variance of an analyst's forecast 
error simplifies from 1/Cr0 + r 1 > to 1/r0 = a 20 , the variance of 
stochastic disturbance terms for the firm's earnings. However, as the 
amount of interim information available to the analyst increases 
(i.e., as n increases>, the variance of the analyst's forecast error 
0 0 ca~FAF) declines monotonically from a~0 (this follows from inspection 
of the expression 1/Cr0 + r 1 >>, explaining one potential source of 
analyst superiority over a random walk model. 4 
Expressed more informally, the variance of stochastic disturbance 
terms adversely affects the forecasting performance of both the random 
walk model and the analyst. One source of analyst superiority over 
the random walk model is that more interim information is available to 
the analyst, enabling FAF to learn about the nature of the current 
contract, and so on). In this way, FAF error variance is reduced 
below that of RW error variance. 
While n, a 2Y' and p reflect different aspects of the firm's 
information environment, a given value of r 1 can be obtained from 
numerous combinations of these variables. Also, as discussed below in 
Section 3, our empirical surrogates do not bear a one-to-one 
correspondence to their theoretical counterparts. Thus, while the 
model does provide a basis for examining the effects of the firm's 
information environment, it cannot be used to determine unambiguously 
which specific attributes of the information environment are relevant. 
5 
3. Sut•t•ogate Select ic•n arrd Hypotheses 
As the theoretical model is derived for a single analyst, the 
empirical tests should, ideally, pertain to the forecasts of a single 
analyst. Forecasts published in The Value Line Investment Survey 
<Value Line) are made by one or two analysts, and may be subject to 
review by other analysts. As such, Value Line forecasts are not 
strictly the forecasts of a single analyst, but they are the closest 
publicly available source of individual analyst forecasts and we use 
them for this purpose. We selected a second sample to determine 
whether the model is empirically valid for consensus FAF. Fc•t' this 
purpose, we utilized the Institutional Brokers Estimate System <IBES) 
tape provided by Lynch, Jones & Ryan. IBES forecasts are a consensus 
of as many as 60 analysts. 
Each set of forecasts utilizes predictions made over three 
hot• i ZOY"rS. Value Line forecasts are predictions made one, two, and 
three quarters in advance; IBES forecasts are final (for the year), 
one, and two years ahead. The Value Line forecasts are obtained in 
the appt•c•pt•iate issue c•f The Value Line lrrvestment S•.n-vey; IBES final 
forecasts are obtained in the last month of the firm's fiscal year; 
IBES one- and two-year-ahead forecasts are made in the sixth month of 
the firm's fiscal year. 
Ideally, we would like to observe the information set of a given 
analyst in order to obtain the covariance matrix of all information 
signals underlying the FAF. The dimensionality of the matrix would 
provide the number of observed information sources (n), while the 
diagonal and off-diagonal elements would provide the variance of 
and covariance (p) between information observations, respectively. 
However, such a matrix is unobservable, necessitating surrogate 
select ior •• 
Following Atiase (1985>, we select firm size <SIZE>, defined as 
the market value of common stock and the book value of long-term debt 
in the fiscal year preceding the year of forecast (source: Compustat 
Industrial tape) as a surrogate for the dimensionality <n> of the 
analyst's information set. We expect FAF superiority to be positively 
related to firm size. 5 
We use prior dispersion of forecasts across various analysts 
following the firm as a proxy for the variance ((.T2 ) y 
Cukierman and Givoly (1982) demonstrated theoretically 
that the divergence of forecasts increases as the variance of 
information observations increases. In the present context, this 
suggests that the dispersion among analysts' forecasts reflects their 
We use the dispersion in 
.-, 
IBES forecasts (coefficient of dispersion> as a proxy for ,.cY' and 
expect FAF superiority to be negatively related to the coefficient of 
dispet~sior •. 6 
For the purpose of the annual IBES sample, dispersion <DISP) is 
observed prior to observing IBES final, one-, and two-year-ahead 
forecasts for a fiscal year. 7 For the purpose of the quarterly Value 
Line sample, it would be ideal to observe FAF dispersion regarding 
upcoming quarterly earnings. However, IBES dispersion is available 
for upcoming fiscal years but not quarters. Accordingly, DISP was 
estimated in the month prior to the month in which the Value Line 
forecast was generated, and pertained to consensus analyst forecasts 
for the fiscal year that Value Line was forecasting. Di spet~s i Col'"• is 
measured as the standard deviation across analysts of upcoming annual 
7 
forecasts for firm j, deflated by the absolute value of the mean 
forecast across analysts. We expect FAF superiority to be negatively 
related to DISP. 
~ 
Unlike n and a~Y' there does not exist a literature to guide us in 
surrogate selection for the covariance (p) between information 
observations. As a proxy for the covariance measure, we selected the 
number of lines of business reported by the firm in •ccordance with 
SFAS No. 14. We reason as follows. Suppose that the n information 
sources available to a particular analyst relate to m lines of 
business. If m is small, the n information signals will be highly 
dependent, and in the extreme may be considered to be repeated 
measures of the same information signal. On the other hand, if m is 
large and the n information signals are randomly assigned to m, the n 
information signals will tend to represent more diverse types of 
information. Thus, we expect the covariance among information signals 
to be a decreasing function of m. The number of lines of business 
(LOB> is defined as the number of distinct lines of business disclosed 
in the fiscal year preceding the year of forecast (source: The Value 
Line Investment Survey>. 8 We expect FAF superiority to be positively 
related to the LOB variable. 
Brown, Griffin, Hagerman, and Zmijewski (1985) showed that FAF 
superiority is positively related to FAF timing advantage. The FAF 
timing advantage for tests involving Value Line is controlled for by 
adding a timing variable <TIME> for tests, measured as the number of 
days lapsed between the end of the previous fiscal quarter and the 
date of the Value Line forecast. The FAF timing advantage for tests 
involving IBES is controlled for by requiring all IBES firms to have 
8 
their forecasts appear on the IBES tape the same number of days after 
their fiscal year end. 9 We expect FAF superiority to be negatively 
related to TIME. 
Imhoff and Pat~e' < 1982) have shc•wn that FAF supet~iot~ity is 
negatively related to forecast horizon. In an effort to control for 
horizon <HOR>, we use dummy variables for one- and two-quarter-ahead 
forecasts for Value Line, and final and one-year-ahead forecasts for 
IBES. The effect of Value Line's three-quarter-ahead forecasts and 
IBES's two-year-ahead forecasts are included in the intercept. We 
expect FAF superiority to be negatively related to HOR. 
4. Sample ar•d Data 
The firms in the Value Line sample are a subset of the 233 firms 
used by Brown, Griffin, Hagerman, and Zmijewski <1985>, hereafter 
BGHZ. Value Line forecasts included in this study are made one, two 
and three quarters in advance of the reported earnings numbers. Of 
the 233 BGHZ firms, 65 were eliminated from our sample because they 
were not covered by either the IBES tape <July 1984) or the Compustat 
Industrial tape <1983>, the sources of data for FAF dispersion and 
firm size, respectively. The 168 Value Line firms are covered for the 
twelve fiscal quarters from first quarter 1977 to fourth quarter 1979. 
The firms in the IBES sample are all firms with continuously 
available data on the IBES tape (i.e., every month> for the 1977-82 
period, and that are covered by the Compustat Industrial tape <1983). 
A total of 673 firms met these criteria. Of these firms, 139 were 
also part of the aforementioned 168 firm Value Line sample. As we 
want to compare the Value Line and IBES sample results for the 168 
firms, we added 29 firms included in the Value Line sample, that did 
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not have continuously available IBES forecast data. 10 Thus, all 168 
Value Line firms were included in the 702 firm IBES sample (673+29). 
For each IBES sample firm, we collected three sets of forecasts for 
each year, 1977-82: the final forecast for the fiscal year made in the 
last month of the fiscal year; and forecasts of the current and 
following fiscal year made six months through the (fiscal> year. 
5. Methodological Considerations 
We now examine empirically the relationship between FAF 
superiority and its theoretical determinants. This requires both the 
specification of a model relating FAF superiority to its theoretical 
determinants and the selection of empirical surrogates for these 
quantities. The model to be used will have the form: 
+ + 
(4) FAFSUP = fCSIZE, DISP, LOB> + e, 
where SIZE is the firm's total capitalization, DISP is prior 
dispersion of forecasts across analysts, LOB is the firm's number of 
lines of business, and the superscript signs indicate the ! priori 
direction of the predictor variables. As discussed in Section 4, 
these are empirical surrogates for n, 2 ~ Y' and P, respectively, the 
theoretical determinants of FAFSUP. 
A surrogate for FAFSUP will be defined for each firm j at each 
time period t. Take <FAF error> 2 and <RW error> 2 as proxies for ~2FAF 
~ 
and ~cRW respectively, where FAF error is the difference between the 
analyst's forecast (from either Value Line or IBES> and the actual 
value of earnings <EPS> for firm j at time t, and RW error is the 
difference between EPS at time t and EPS at time t-1 for firm j. 
Motivated by equation (3), we define the empirical surrogate FAFSUPS 
for FAFSUP as the ratio of squared errors: 
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We define two additional surrogates that are transformations of 
FAFSUPS, the ratio of absolute errors and the logarithm of FAFSUPS: 
Where necessary, a small constant was added to the value of FAFSUPS 
before taking the logarithm. 
The surrogate for FAFSUP was calculated from Value Line and IBES 
data that do not overlap the data used to calculate SIZE, DISP, and 
LOB. We substitute these empirical surrogates into equation (4) and 
use regression to analyze the resulting data. If we obtair. 
significant effects attributable to SIZE, DISP and LOB, these will 
constitute evidence supporting both the model specification and the 
surrogate selection. 
In order to combine time-series and cross-sectional data in one 
overall linear regression, we adopt a model with constant slope 
coefficients and an intercept that varies with respect to forecast 
horizon, industry membership, and calendar year (quarter) as explained 
by Judge, Hill, Griffith, and Lee (1980, p. 338). The appt~c•ach 
involves fitting the following model for LDG 10 <FAFSUPS>: 
8 
+ ~5HOR1jt + ~6HOR2jt + ~ riiijt 
i=l 
c 
+ ~ 6 kTkjt + Ejt 
k=l 
j = fir~m j, j=1, ••• , 168 <Value Line, IBES>; .j=1, ••• , 702 
< IBES>. 
11 
t =quarter t, t=1, .•• ,12 <Value Line>; year t, t=1, ... ,6 
y.t 
.) 
LSIZE.jt 
LDISP.jt 
LTIMEjt 
= 
= 
= 
< IBES>. 
<Value Line); year t <IBES>. 
LOG 10 <SIZE.jt>· 
LOG 10 <DISPjt>. 
LOG 10 <TIMEjt). <Value Line sample only.> 
HOR 1.jt = 1 or 0, a horizon dummy that is 1 if forecast is one-
quarter-ahead <Value Line) or final forecast <IBES>. 
HOR2 jt = 1 or O, a horizon dummy that is 1 if forecast is two-
quarters-ahead <Value Line) or one-year-ah~ad <IBES>. The 
effects of Value Line's three-quarter-ahead forecasts and 
IBES's two-year-ahead forecasts are included in the 
I· ·t = 1 c•t~ 0, ar. i r.dustt~y durnmy fot~ fi t~rn j i r. quat~tet~ t l.J 
representing industry category i, i=1, •.• ,8. The effect 
of industry category 9 is included in the overall intercept. 
Tk·t = 1 or 0, a tirne dummy for firm .j in quarter (year) t, 
.) 
representing quarter <year) k, k =quarter 1, ... , 11 
<Value Line); k, k = yeat~ 1, ••. , 5 <IBES>. The effect of 
quarter 12 <year 6) is included in the overall intercept. 
ejt = rnodel disturbance term, assumed to be serially independent, 
independent of the predictor variables, and distributed 
r.ot~ma 1 1 y. 11 
The logarithmic transformation of the dependent and predictor 
variables was chosen after considering several alternatives; it 
resulted in a modest improvement in model fit, compared to results 
(not reported) using the untransformed variables. Moreover, standard 
1 .-. 
.::. 
tests or normality or model error terms could not reject normality 
arter taking log transformations. In its raw form, FAFSUPS exhibits 
substantial positive skewness. <For a discussion or transrormations, 
see Bc•x ar•d Tidwell < 19E.2>. > Where necessary, a small constant was 
added to the original variable berore taking the log transrormation. 
The inclusion of industry membership and year <quarter> dummies 
attempts to control for intercept differences due to industry and 
calendar effects, factors that our intuition suggests are related to 
FAF superiority. If the frequency or magnitude of random shocks 
affecting firm earnings is not uniform across industry or calendar 
time, and if such shocks do not affect FAF error and RW error equally, 
then FAF superiority could depend on industry and year. 12 
E.. Er11pit~ical Results 
E.. 1 Data Descript ior,13 
Table 1 contains a profile of FAF superiority for the 1E.8 firm 
quarterly <Value Line) sample across the predictor variables: SIZE, 
DISP, LOB, and TIME. Except for LOB, strong patterns are evident, 
with relationships being nearly monotonic for all variables. 
specifically, looking down the columns (i.e., holding forecast horizon 
constant>, the relationship is strictly monotonic for SIZE and DISP 
for all horizons, and for TIME for the one- and two-quarter-ahead 
hot~i zons. Looking across the rows (i.e., letting forecast horizon 
increase>, the relationship is strictly monotonic for all the 
predictor variables. The profile suggests that FAF superiority is 
related to the predictors in the hypothesized direction: SIZE (+), 
DISP <->, TIME (+), and HOR <->. No clear pattern of association is 
evident ror LOB. Table 2 contains similar results for the same 1E.8 
13 
firms and the 702 firms using annual <IBES> data. Once again, except 
for LOB, the relationships are nearly monotonic for all variables, and 
FAF's superiority is related to the predictors in the hypothesized 
direct ior •• 14 
6.2 Multivariate Tests of Association 
Table 3 contains the results of pooled time-series cross-
sectional linear regressions relating FAF superiority to the predictor 
variables for the 168 firm quarterly <Panel A>, 168 firm annual <Panel 
B>, and 702 firm annual samples <Panel C>, respectively. Residual 
plots were examined and a linear fit appeared to be adequate. 
The results confirm the patterns suggested by the profiles in 
tables 1 ar.d 2. Firm size <LSIZE> has the predicted positive 
coefficient and is significant at the 5 percent level in all three 
Prior analyst dispersion <LDISP> has the predicted 
negative coefficient and is significant at the 5 percent level in all 
three regressions. Number of lines of business <LOB> has the 
predicted positive coefficient in one case <Panel B>, but the opposite 
sign in another case <Panel A>. The LOB variable is not significant 
i Y• e it het• case. The timing variable <LTIME> has the expected positive 
sign and is significant (see Panel A>. Finally, the two forecast 
horizon dummy variables have the expected sign. 15 These results are 
consistent with the univariate tests and are generally consistent with 
an information interpretation of FAF superiority. 
7. Summat•y and Implications 
Past research focusing upon FAF superiority has been primarily 
evaluative, comparing analysts' forecasts to those of other <primarily 
14 
time-series) models. Little work has been done to date that 
theoretically or empirically models the determinants of FAF 
superiority. This study developed a Bayesian model that relates FAF 
superiority to three attributes of the information set underlying FAF 
(with expected sign of association indicated): (1) the dimensionality 
of the information set (+), (2) the variance of information 
observations (-), and (3) the covariance among information 
observations (-). 
Empirically, surrogates for the theoretical factors were chosen. 
The ratio of RW error variance to FAF error variance CFAFSUPS> was our 
surrogate for FAF superiority, the dependent variable. Firm size 
(SIZE>, prior dispersion of FAF forecasts <DISP>, and the number of 
lines of business <LOB) proxy for the three predictor variables. 16 
Significant effects were found for SIZE and DISP, but not for LOB. We 
attribute the poor findings for LOB to its inability to serve as an 
adequate proxy for p, rather than top being an unimportant attribute 
of the analyst's information set. (See footnote 8.) Thus, we 
conclude that an information interpretation underlies the association 
between FAF superiority and our predictor variables. 
Our findings have implications for studies that require measures 
of earnings expectations as well as for studies that incorporate 
differential information environments into capital ma1·kets research. 
If a researcher requires an earnings predictor for the purpose of 
generating an accurate forecast, and if the choice is limited to 
either an analyst's forecast or the forecast of a random walk model, 
the researcher should consider the firm's information environment when 
making the choice. More specifically, the random walk model generally 
will be a poorer choice vis a vis the analyst's forecast when 
15 
the firm is large and the prior dispersion of analysts' forecasts is 
sr.1a 11. On the other hand, the researcher is less likely to commit a 
type t~o error (fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal forecast 
accuracy of the analyst and the random walk model when it should be 
rejected) if the firm is small and the prior dispersion of analysts~ 
forecasts is large. 
Relying upon the work of Ohlson <1979>, sever~l recent studies 
have incorporated differential information environments into capital 
markets research. These studies have shown that the capital market 
reaction to the firm's reported earnings depends upon one particular 
aspect of the firm's information environment, the number of available 
information signals <e.g., Atiase (1985>; Kross and Schroeder <1985); 
Shot~es ( 1985) ) • For example, Atiase (1985) explores the hypothesis of 
firm-size related differential availability. He suggests that firm 
size is a crude proxy for the firm's information environment. We 
Our theoretical model demonstrates that the number of 
available information sources is only one of three aspects of the 
firm's information environment. Our model suggests that the 
exter•t of •::.vet~lap Cot~ "c•::.variance") between il""•f•::.r~r.latiol""• sr:,._n~ces must 
a 1 sc• be cor.sidet~ed in add it i•:•n tc• the number~ ( "d imensi c•na 1 it y") c•f 
information sources. Empirically, we explore finer partitions of the 
firm's information environment, through the use of multiple empirical 
pr~c•x i es. 
Our evidence suggests that, after including firm size in the 
regression model, prior dispersion of FAF forecasts is a significant 
determinant of FAF superiority. Thus, we show both theoretically and 
16 
empirically that multivariate approaches to explaining FAF superiority 
in an information context are more appropriate than univarate 
appt~c.aches. 
Studies that have incorporated differential information 
environments into capital markets research have investigated the 
capital market reaction to the release of the report. 
Grant <1980) observed a larger capital market reaction to reports of 
OTC firms than to reports of NYSE firms; McNichols and Manegold <1983) 
found the capital market reaction to annual reports to be smaller when 
they at~e pt~ec£;>ded by intet-·irn t~epot'ts thar1 ~o-JhE·n ir1tet~im t'epor-·ts Wf::'l'£~ 
unavailable; Atiase <1985) showed that the magnitude of capital market 
reaction is negatively related to firm size. 
The relationship between the release of an earnings report and 
the capital market reaction to the report has two facets. The fi t'St 
fG.'I.cet is the extent of the "tmexpected e<:H'l'lings" t'evealed tht'ough the 
t-·epc•t't; the secc•nd is the mappir•g of "une>-:pected eat'nings" to capitc:d 
Our evidence suggests that there exists an 
information interpretation to the first facet, and as such our 
findings are consistent with those of the above studies. 
specifically, a sufficient condition for the findings of Grant (1980), 
McNichols and Manegold (1983>, and Atiase (1985) is that it is more 
difficult to predict the earnings of OTC than NYSE firms, of annual 
earnings preceded by interim reports than annual earnings not preceded 
by interim reports, and earnings of small firms vis a vis those of 
large firms, respectively. 
In our model, the firm's information environment affects the 
amount cof "sttt'pt'ise" (ur.expected eat'r1ingsl t'evealed by the 
Cconditional upcon the sign and magnitude of the 
17 
firm's information environment. Whether or not the mapping of 
"sut~pt~ise" to capital rnat~ket t~eaction depends upc•r• the firm's 
information environment is beyond the scope of this study and is 
a subject for further research. 
18 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Albrecht, Johnson, Lookabill, and Watson (1977) suggested (but did 
not test) a number of factors (e.g., year, forecast horizon, 
industry, firm size, number of lines of business, and variance of 
firm earnings) that potentially explain FAF errors. Theit• 1 ist 
of factors employed intuition and the results of prior empirical 
studies rather than formal modeling techniques~ 
2. "Ir,tet·im infot·matic•n" is defined as all infc··r·mation available to 
analysts that is not contained in the sequence of past earnings 
numbe·r·s. 
n equal tc• 0. The model's assumptions imply that the 
expt•essions "ir,fc•r·matior, set ,_,r,det·lyir•g FAF" ar1d "fit·m' s 
information environment'' are equivalent, since the analyst uses 
all available information regarding the firm. Assumptions 5 and 
~ pertain to annual data. For quarterly data, the seasonal 
random walk model R1 = R1 _ 4 + a 1 will be used (assumption 5), and 
the mean of the prior predictive distribution for R1 becomes 
ECR1 IR1 _ 4 = rT_4 J = r 1 _ 4 <assumption 6). 
3. The model's implications are consistent with Holthausen and 
Verrecchia (1981), who demonstrated that the variance of price 
reaction to earnings is a negative function of the precision of 
interim information, and with Ohlson (1979>, who demonstrated 
that the variance of price reaction to announced earnings is 
greater in a coarser interim disclosure environment than in a 
finer information environment. 
4. While the model explicitly addresses FAF superiority relative to 
a random walk model, the results are easily generalized to 
earnings processes for which more complicated univariate time 
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series models apply. For example, for an autoregressive time-
series model of order 1, RT = ¢RT-l +aT where the aT's are 
identically distributed, uncorrelated random variables with mean 
. 2 
var' 1 ance cr 0 , the variance of a k-step-ahead TS forecast 
is 2 •:ro 
1-¢2k 
( -------). 
1-¢2 
See Abraham and Ledolter (1983, p. 2'+1 ) • 
The reciprocal of this expression would become r 0 in the analysis 
The expression for 2 a0 changes with other lS 
specifications, but the essential point remains: FAF ~=· uper' i or' :i. t y 
equals a 2 T8 ta2 FAF' the ratio of univariate time series <TS) 
model error variance to FAF error variance. We selected 
RW because it is the simplest of the univariate time-series models. 
5. Kross and Schroeder (1985) found that the number of inches in the 
Wall Street Journal provided incremental information content 
beyond that contained in firm size when attempting to explain 
cross-sectional differences in the stock market's reaction to 
quarterly earnings announcements. When variable selection in the 
model (7) of Section 5 was performed with stepwise inclusion and 
elimination of variables, firm size entered the model but the 
number of millimetres in The Wall Street Journal Index did not. 
When the number of WSJ millimetres was included in the initial 
model, the firm size entered the model and the number of WSJ 
millimetres was deleted in a subsequent step. Thus, we did not 
find the number of millimetres in The Wall Street Journal Index 
to be a significant determinant of FAF superiority. 
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6. One potential problem with the IBES dispersion measure is the 
possibility that the forecasts used to calculate dispersion may 
not be contemporaneous, since the dates of forecasts vary (see 
0' Bt~ien (1985)). The problem ic not severe if the age 
distribution of forecast is random cross-sectionally. 
Unfortunately, we do not know the age distribution of th~ IBES 
forecasts, so we are unable to ascertain the severity of this 
A second potential problem with the IBES dispersion 
measure is that it relates to annual rather than quarterly 
Thus, it is likely tc• be a mot~e suitable ~n-·c·xy fot~ 
IBES than for Value Line data. However, no measure of the 
coefficient of dispersion of analysts' quarterly forecasts is 
available. As the Section 6 findings suggest that the dispersion 
in IBES fc•t~ecasts appeat~s to be a suitable pt~c.xy fc•t~ the e>: an~e 
uncertainty about upcoming quarterly earnings, the use of an 
annual measure of dispersion for quarterly data does not appear 
to be a critical problem. 
7. In order to ensure that prio~ dispersion was measured, dispersion 
was observed prior to observing IBES final, one-, and two-year-
ahead forecasts for a fiscal year. 
1978 for a December year-end firm. 
For example, consider fiscal 
Forecasts for fiscal 1973 
were observed in December 1977, and the dispersion of those 
forecasts <DISP78> was calculated. In June 1978 <mid-year>, 
forecasts for fiscal 1978 were observed and a one-year-ahead 
forecast error was calculated for fiscal 1978. In Jur•e 1978, 
forecasts were also observed for fiscal 1979 (since IBES reports 
forecasts for one and two fiscal years ahead) and a two-year-
ahead forecast error was calculated for fiscal 1979. Ir• Decembet' 
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1978, final forecasts for fiscal 1978 were observed and the final 
forecast error for fiscal 1978 was calculated. Associations were 
tested for between DISP78 and one-year-ahead forecast error for 
fiscal 1978, final forecast error for fiscal 1978, and two-year-
ahead forecast error for fiscal 1979. This procedure ensures 
that prior forecast dispersion is related to errors in 
subsequently generated forecasts. 
8. There does not exist a uniform definition of a line of business. 
Each firm defines LOB in its own way. For example, one oil 
company may list oil and gas as a separate LOB from refining and 
processing; another oil company may treat them as a single LOB. 
In order to conduct cross-sectional tests, we attempted to define 
lines of business in a uniform manner. Whenever possible, we 
adopted the LOB coding scheme contained in the 1984 version of 
the Value Line Data Base. 
9. It is not strictly true that all IBES firms have the same timing 
advar.tage. IBES forecasts are a consensus of individual 
forecasts and each forecast is made on a diffe~ent date (sec 
O'Brien (1985>>. Thus, our procedure for adjusting for FAF 
timing advantage for IBES is only an approximation. 
10. Adding firms without continuously available data on the IBES tape 
involved mechanically adjusting each firm's data. As this was a 
very time-intensive task, we did not attempt to add any other 
IBES firms with missing forecast data. 
11. The reported t-statistics in Section 6 are derived under the 
assumption that cross-sectional dependencies do not exist, an 
assumption that is clearly violated for FAFSUPS. We comp1.tted t-· 
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statistics corrected for estimates of cross-sectional correlation 
in OLS residuals . The significance of reported results, at the 
• 05 level, remained intact. The correction procedure involved 
calculating the sample covariance matrix, S, using residuals from 
the first-pass OLS regression. Because we have fewer time-series 
observations than firms, S is singular and thus cannot be 
inverted. This prevents us from usi~g GLS procedures to estimate 
and draw inferences about model parameters. However, because S 
converges to ~' the full cross-sectional covariance matrix of 
regression disturbances, asymptotic inferences can be drawn about 
the significance of OLS regression coefficients. Rex Thompson 
suggested and programmed the modification for cross-sectional 
dependencies. 
12. The empirical model adopted [or (7)J fits the data significantly 
better than the model with a constant intercept over industries 
or years <quarters>. This supports the intuitive belief that a 
model with constant intercept omits terms that should be present. 
Such omissions lead to biased parameter estimates and inaccurate 
tests <Seber, 1977, Section 6. 1). For the sake of parsimony in 
table presentation, the industry and calendar time effects are 
not reported. Pooling of the data assumes homogeneity of the 
distribution of FAFSUPS across industries, time periods, and 
forecast horizons. We tested for and could not reject 
homogeneity. 
13. For each of the three samples (168 quarterly, 168 annual, 702 
annual>, the maximum possible number of FAF observations is 2016 
<168 x 12), 672 (168 x 4>, 4212 <702 x 6>, respectively. 
Missing values come about because of missing FAF errors and 
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missing DISP observations (mostly cases where DISP is undefined 
because a single analyst follows the firm). Due tc. r11issing 
FAF observations, the number of non-missing FAF errors declines 
depending c.n the fc.recast horizon. For the annual samples, 1975 
FAF observations were unavailable on the IBES tape; accordingly, 
the two-year-ahead FAF errc.r for fiscal 1977 is always missing. 
14. The correlations between predictor variables (~hile 
sometimes statistically significant) are nc.t severe. For 
example, for the c.ne-quarter-ahead horizon~ the pairwise Pearson 
correlation coefficients between LSIZE and LDISB, LSIZE and LOB, 
and LDISP and LOB are -0.25, -. 12, and -0. 10, respectively. 
15. The horizon dummies have a positive sign because of our procedure 
of reflecting the effect of the longest horizon (i.e., three-
quarters-ahead for Value Line; two-years-ahead for IBES> in the 
Thus, the dummy variables reflect the effect of 
the shorter horizons and are expected to have positive 
coefficients. 
positive, negative, and positive, respectively. 
is of the opposite sign to its theoretical cc.unterpart because we 
expect LOB to be negatively related to p, 
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TABLE 1 
Profile of Value Line FAF Superioritya 
by Categories of Predictor Variables 
{Pooled Time-series Cross-Sectional) 
186 Firns, Cuarterly Data (1977-1979) 
Cell Median (Nlurber of Cl>servations)b 
Predictor 
Variables Grouping 1 Cuarter Ahecrl 2 Q.tarter Ahecrl 3 Quar:ter Ahecrl 
SIZE Under 100 million 1.29 (113) 
100-500 million 2.00 (727) 
501 million-1 billion 2.04 (466) 
OVer 1 billion 2.29 (595) 
TOTAL 2.00(1901) 
DISP CUINI'ILE 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
TOl'AL 
IDB 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 or IOOre 
TOI'AL 
TIME 
0-30 days 
31-60 days 
61-90 days 
over 90 days 
TOTAL 
2.90 (347) 
2.00 (347) 
2.00 (347) 
1.94 (348) 
1.83 (348) 
2.05(1737) 
2.05 {773) 
1.90 (473) 
2.11 (294) 
2.16 (306) 
2.07 (55) 
2.00(1901) 
1.63 (118) 
2.00 {697) 
2.00 (496) 
2.29 {590) 
2.00(1901) 
1.07 (113) 
1.47 (726) 
1.57 (465) 
1. 79 (593) 
1.56 (1897) 
2.01 (339) 
1.61 {340) 
1.59 (340) 
1.40 (340) 
1.30 (340) 
1.57(1699) 
1.53 (770) 
1.57 (469) 
1.48 (294) 
1.68 {308) 
1.78 (56) 
1.56(1897) 
1.33 {125) 
1.49 (697) 
1.64 (479) 
1.67 (596) 
1.56(1897) 
. aFAFSUPSjt 1/2 = !Seasonal m Errorjt/FAF Errorjt I 
1.00 (113) 
1.28 (710) 
1.36 (430) 
1.50 (587) 
1.33(1840) 
1.88 (317) 
1.58 (317) 
1.33 (317) 
1.20 (317) 
1.07 (317) 
1.35(1585) 
1.33 (728) 
1.33 (460) 
1.28 (294) 
1.45 (303) 
1.47 (55) 
1.33(1840) 
1.33 (126) 
1.34 (686) 
1.34 (427) 
1.33 (601) 
1.33(1840) 
brbe number of cases is less than the total possible number of 
cases (168 firms x 12 quarters = 2016) due to missing values. 
TABLE 2 
Profile of IBES Consensus FAF SUperiorityCl 
by Categories of Predictor Variables 
(Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional) 
Cell Median (amber of CJ:>servations)b 
Predictor 
Variables Grouping Final Forecast 1 Year Ahead 2 Year Ahead 
A. 168 Firms, Annual Data (1977-1979) 
SIZE Under 100 million 1.72 (23) .87 "(20) .6.5 (9) 
100-500 million 4.44 (169) 1.55 (164) 1.41 (78) 
501 million-! billion 5.15 (127) 2.04 (126) 2.16 (77) 
Over 1 billion 6.99 (173) 2.63 (173) 2.25 (115) 
TOI'AL 4.85 (492) 1.86 (483) 1.83 (279) 
DISP (JJINI'ILE 1 9.01 (87) 3.72 (87) 3.50 (51) 
2 5.99 (87) 2.62 (87) 1.95 (52) 
3 3.91 (88) 1.65 (88) 1.55 (52) 
4 4.78 (88) 1.61 (88) 1.54 (52) 
5 4.29 (88) 1.45 (88) 1.30 (52) 
TOI'AL 5.00 (438) 1.88 (438) 1.86 (259) 
IDB 1 4.90 (195) 1.78 (187) 1.76 (105) 
2 5.24 (126) 2.01 (126) 2.16 (78) 
3 3.66 (73) 1.71 (73) 1.36 (40) 
4 5.52 (84) 1.89 (84) 2.21 (49) 
5 or nore 13.89 (14) 3.86 (13) 2.59 (7) 
TOrAL 4.85 (492) 1.86 (483) 1.83 (279) 
B. 702 Firms, Annual Data (1977-1982) 
SIZE Under 100 million 4.00 (654) 1.60 (651) 1.27 (345) 
100-500 million 4.50(1753) 1.82(1748) 1.57(1201) 
500-1000 million 4.07 (941) 1.87 (940) 1.50 (735) 
Over 1 billion 5.15 (824) 2.14 (824) 1.69 (673) 
TOrAL 4.50(4172) 1.85(4163) 1.55(2954) 
DISP (JJINI'ILE 1 6.29 (762) 2.80 (762) 2.69 (565) 
2 4.63 (762) 2.16 (762) 1.83 (565) 
3 4.22 (762) 1.81 (762} 1.44 (565) 
4 4.00 (763) 1.52 (763} 1.23 (565) 
5 4.00 (763) 1.54 (763} 1.08 (566) 
TOl'AL 4.50(3812) 1.86(3812} 1.53(2826) 
aFAFSUPSPjt 112 = !Annual 1\W Errorjt/FAF Errorjt I 
b:rbe nunber of cases is less than the total possible nunber of 
cases (168 firms x 3 years = 504; 702 firms x 6 years = 4212) due to 
missing values. 
Betas 
T-Stat 
Betas 
T-stat 
TABLE 3 
Results of Regressions of FAF SUperiority Measuresa 
{Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional) 
PREDICTOR VARIABLES KDEL Sl'AT¥I'ICS 
LSIZEj~ IDISPjt IDBjt LTIMEjt IDRljt IDR2jt N Adj .R F 
A. Value Line Quarterly Sample {168 Firms) 
.150 -.295 -.021 .284 .301 .132 5021 .04 17.37 
{5.23)* {-6.53) * {-1. 79) (3.46)* (9.03)* {3.94) * 
B • IBES Annual Sample {168 Firms) 
• 440 -.396 .030 .661 .082 1135 .17 24.96 
(7.31)* {-4.09)* (1.33) {9.06)* {1.12) 
C. IBES Annual Sample {702 Firms) 
Betas .084 -.256 .741 .209 10450 .13 109.14 
T-stat (4.42)* (-8.20)* (30.40)* (8.57)* 
*Significant at a = .05. 
aFor the Value Line quarterly sample, the deperrlent ~riab1e is u:x:;10{FAFSUPS), 
measured as u:x:;10 [{Seasonal RW Err~~t(FAF Errorjt> ]. For the IBES sample, 
the deperrlent var iabte is IDG10 (FAFSUPS), measurea as u:x:;10 [(Annual RW 
Errorit/FAF Errorjt> ]. Prior to taking the log transformation, a small 
positive constant was added due to zero FAF errors. 
